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Themain contributors to sea-level rise (oceans, glaciers, and ice sheets)
respond to climate change on timescales ranging from decades to
millennia. A focus on the 21st century thus fails to provide a complete
picture of the consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions on future sea-level rise and its long-term impacts. Here
we identify the committed global mean sea-level rise until 2300 from
historical emissions since 1750 and the currently pledged National
Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement until
2030. Our results indicate that greenhouse gas emissions over this 280-
y period result in about 1 m of committed global mean sea-level rise
by 2300, with the NDC emissions from 2016 to 2030 corresponding to
around 20 cm or 1/5 of that commitment. We also find that 26 cm
(12 cm) of the projected sea-level-rise commitment in 2300 can be
attributed to emissions from the top 5 emitting countries (China,
United States of America, European Union, India, and Russia) over the
1991–2030 (2016–2030) period. Our findings demonstrate that global
and individual country emissions over the first decades of the 21st
century alone will cause substantial long-term sea-level rise.
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Future global mean sea-level rise (GMSLR) poses a threat toecosystems (1), the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of
people (2), and world heritage (3, 4) along the Earth’s coasts. Global
mean sea level has risen by around 20 cm since 1900, with acceler-
ating current rates of around 3 mm/y (5–7). The key contributors to
sea-level change are ocean thermal expansion, glaciers, and the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, all of which are now contrib-
uting to current sea-level rise at an increasing rate in response to
ongoing global warming (5). These contributors respond to warming
on multiple timescales, ranging from decades to centuries for glaciers
and centuries to millennia for thermal expansion and ice sheets (8,
9). Due to this long integrated response time, the GMSLR from
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is now only in its initial
stages. A focus on the scenario dependency of GMSLR for the 21st
century thus does not reflect the sensitivity of future long-term
GMSLR to historical and future emissions as the full response to
these emissions will only materialize on a millennial timescale (9–12).
For the near-term future up to 2030, aggregated Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs), as submitted under the Paris
Agreement framework, reflect the global mitigation ambition and
result in quantifiable emission trajectories. The level of ambition
implied by the NDCs is routinely compared to 2030 emission
scenarios in line with 1.5 or 2 °C scenarios (13). Alternatively, the
aggregated NDCs are translated into a Global Mean Temperature
(GMT) signal up to 2100 for benchmarking against the Long-term
Temperature Goal of the Paris Agreement (14). In contrast, the
aspect of locked-in post-2100 consequences of near-term emissions
has not been a central part of high-level political discourse. In this
study, we use GMSLR modeling that can handle emission sce-
narios flexibly (15, 16) to establish the link between pledged NDC
emissions and GMSLR until 2300, thus highlighting the longer-
term climate change implications of current climate mitigation
efforts. We simulate the GMSLR commitment of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions over the historical period (from 1750) and up to
2030, globally and for the 5 highest-emitting countries individually.
Attributing Global Mean Sea-Level Change to NDC Emission
Pledges
We use a sea-level emulator (15) that includes contributions from
thermal expansion, global glaciers, the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS),
the Antarctic Ice Sheet (AIS), and land-water storage. The emu-
lator is part of the MAGICC simple climate model (17). Each
component is calibrated to process-based projections consistent
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 5th
Assessment Report (AR5) (5) using a maximum likelihood opti-
mization technique. In addition to the IPCC AR5 consistent AIS
representation that captures surface mass balance effects (18) as
well as solid ice discharge contributions with fast dynamics (19), we
also implement an alternative version for AIS loss (20) that cap-
tures the higher sensitivity to future global warming from addi-
tional nonlinear processes related to Marine Ice Cliff Instability
(MICI) (21). We use the MICI version to identify the potential for
risk from higher sea-level rise not covered by our main results, but
emphasize that the understanding of MICI and its triggers is still
limited (22). Our sea-level emulator allows us to project GMSLR
for emission scenarios until 2300. No estimates are provided
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beyond this time horizon, as some information from process-
based models used for the calibration (i.e., Antarctic solid ice
discharge) is not available beyond 2300 (15).
Current NDCs are provided until the year 2030. With respect to
GMT rise, the recent IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of
1.5 °C concluded that “pathways reflecting these ambitions would
not limit global warming to 1.5 °C” (23). More specific projections
regarding the long-term GMT implications of the NDCs are
strongly dependent on assumptions about emissions after 2030.
Assessments of the end-of-century temperature implications of
NDCs commonly assume some form of continuation in ambition
reflected in pledged climate mitigation targets (24).
Here we follow a different approach that aims to avoid uncer-
tainties regarding future ambition levels by analyzing stylized emis-
sion scenarios with zero Kyoto-GHG emissions after the end of the
NDC accounting period in 2030. Assuming abrupt zero aerosol
emissions would lead to a short-term increase in GMT (Fig. 1B). In
order to avoid artifacts of such abrupt warming on long-term sea-
level rise (Fig. 1C), we decrease aerosols and all other gases not
regulated under the Kyoto protocol until 2075 (Methods). This styl-
ized approach allows us to isolate the effects of NDCs and country-
level emissions on longer-termGMSLR without making assumptions
about global or individual country emissions pathways after 2030.
Cumulative NDC CO2 emissions relative to preindustrial are
estimated to reach around 765 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) in 2030.
Fig. 1 depicts total anthropogenic CO2 emission estimates (A) and
resulting probabilistic 2100 GMT (B) and GMSLR (C) responses
for our 2030 NDC pathway. For illustration purposes, we also
provide estimates for a representative 2 °C warming comparison
pathway (RCP2.6) and the NDC extension pathway by the Climate
Action Tracker (CAT) consortium (24, 25). For the GMT re-
sponse, we can identify the diminishing influence of short-term
climate forcers in the first decades after the year of zero emissions.
The global 2030 NDC pathway allows us to quantify the NDC
GMSLR commitment in 2100 and 2300, accounting for historical
emissions since 1750. The chosen time frame up to 2030 further
allows us to assess the contribution of individual emitters. To
isolate country-level emission shares, we define 2 emission ac-
counting periods for which country-level information is available
(Methods). We call the first period from 1991 to 2030 the “IPCC
period” as the first IPCC report was published in 1990. The sec-
ond period from 2016 to 2030 is termed the “Paris period” as it
exclusively covers the emissions after the 2015 Paris Agreement
until 2030 (pre-2020 commitments and NDCs). For both ac-
counting periods, emissions of the 5 biggest emitters (China,
United States of America [USA], European Union [EU28], India,
and Russia) are individually removed from the reference 2030
NDC pathway (Fig. 2). We estimate that China is responsible for
83 (44) GtC, the USA for 59 (21) GtC, the EU28 for 41 (13)
GtC, India for 19 (11) GtC, and Russia for 18 (7) GtC of CO2
emissions over the IPCC (Paris) periods (25, 26).
For our global NDC pathway, we project a median peak
warming of around 1.5 °C (66% range: 1.3 to 1.7 °C) relative to
1750 for the year 2035, then declining to a committed warming of
around 1.3 °C (1.0 to 1.7 °C) in 2100 (Fig. 1B). For the top 5
emitters combined, historical and pledged emissions until the end
of the first NDC period cause a 2100 warming of 0.45 and 0.2 °C
for the IPCC and Paris periods, respectively (Fig. 2 B and E).
National-Level GMSLR Commitments
In response to the warming trajectories of historical emissions,
pledged NDC emission reductions, and zero GHG emissions after
2030, we estimate that, relative to the IPCC AR5 reference period
1986–2005, GMSLR will rise by 43 cm (66% range: 34 to 54 cm) in
2100 and continue to increase by 105 cm (79 to 135 cm) in 2300
(Fig. 2 and Table 1). The 2300 GMSLR commitments of global
emissions prior to the IPCC (1991) and Paris (2016) periods yield
around 60 (48 to 75) cm and 84 (66 to 109) cm, respectively. Using
the IPCC accounting period (1991–2030), pathways that exclude 1
of the top 5 emitters reduce median 2300 GMSLR by around
10 cm for China, 7 cm for the USA, 5 cm for the EU28, and 2 cm
for India and Russia (Table 2). For this 40-y period, the top 5
emitters are therefore responsible for a median of around 26 cm
GMSLR in 2300, which is more than the roughly 20 cm observed
since the beginning of the 20th century and about 25% of the total
2300 GMSLR NDC commitment. Using the Paris accounting
period (2016–2030), the median 2300 GMSLR contribution ranges
from roughly 6 cm for China, 3 cm for the USA, 2 cm for the EU28,
and about 1 cm for India and Russia. For the 15-y Paris timeframe,
the top 5 emitters thus commit GMSLR to a median of around 12
cm, more than 50% of the observed 20th century GMSLR.
For both accounting periods, country-level GMSLR contribu-
tions reflect changes in relative emission shares and therefore
underline the overall sensitivity of 2300 GMSLR to changes in
near-term emissions (Fig. 3). The fossil-fuel-intensive histories of
the USA and EU28, for example, move both their CO2 emission
A B C
Fig. 1. Total annual CO2 emissions including land use (GtC/y) (A), resulting median GM (B), and GMSLR (C) projections for the stylized zero 2030 NDC reference
pathway (solid), zero 1991 and 2016 pathways (dash-dotted), as well as 2 °C (dashed) and NDC extension comparison pathways (light dotted). In 1991, 2016, and
2030 zero pathways, all GHG are set to zero in respective years except for aerosols and non-Kyoto gases which are phased out exponentially until 2075 (Methods).
The median GMT and GMSLR responses for the 2030 NDC reference pathway without aerosol phase-out are also shown (dotted). Projected 2100 GMSLR median
and 66% ranges under RCP2.6 from IPCC AR5, M16 (16), and K17 (41) are shown for comparison. GMT is provided in °C relative to 1750, IPCC AR5-consistent GMSLR
is provided in cm relative to the 1986–2005 average. Shaded GMT and GMSLR uncertainties reflect the 66% model ranges.
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and resulting GMSLR shares closer to China for the IPCC period,
while for the Paris period, the projected decrease in fossil-fuel
intensity for the EU28 shifts the country group toward the grow-
ing CO2 emissions and respective GMSLR contributions of the
developing economy of India (Fig. 3). Unlike historical emissions
until 1991 or 2016, pledged national emissions until 2030 are not
yet locked in, but if they are followed, they will cause ∼20 cm of
GMSLR in 2300. When focusing on the Paris period, the attrib-
utable country contributions to projected long-term GMSLR
emphasize the impact of countries’ emissions during both the
IPCC and Paris periods and clearly point to the potential of re-
ducing the future GMSLR commitment by more ambitious na-
tional emission reduction targets.
We also tested our results to the sensitivity of model choice for
Antarctic ice discharge by including the MICI mechanism (20, 21),
denoted DP16 in the following. Median sea-level estimates and
uncertainties for 2300 are shown as vertical bars in Fig. 2. Based on
this sensitivity test, the top 5 emitters would be responsible for
around 41 cm GMSLR in 2300, using the IPCC accounting period
(Fig. 2). For the Paris period, the top 5 emitters together would
cause a GMSLR commitment of about 20 cm.
While the median GMSLR commitments resulting from the
DP16 sensitivity test (20, 21) are lower than in our main results,
they also show a wider sea-level response range to carbon emis-
sions. This reflects the fact that our MAGICC ensemble has a
wider range of temperature responses than the temperature re-
sponses used in DP16, with rare strong warming triggering MICI-
style ice loss, and that the emulated DP16 reference data contain
individual ensemble members that do not show ice loss until 2300
under strong mitigation (20). We note, however, that the tem-
peratures identified by DP16 for triggering MICI are anomalously
low with respect to projections using a combination of satellite
observations, an established polar regional climate model, and
climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project
5 (27). This suggests that the temperature thresholds for triggering
MICI in the sea-level emulator should be higher than used here,
making it even less likely that MICI would be triggered by the
warming associated with the global NDC pathway used in our study.
Recent work has also pointed to other uncertainties associated with
the MICI hypothesis, including the strength of the MICI feedback,
how it might vary in different locations, and the possibility that it
might be mitigated by associated responses (freshwater entering
the ocean, buttressing by ice mélange, changes in relative sea level
from gravitational and solid-Earth effects) (22). Given that the
MICI hypothesis is based on only 1 study and is subject to a wide
range of uncertainties, further work is required to assess the im-
plications of this ice-sheet instability mechanism for our results.
Estimating the sea-level contributions for pledged emission
reductions of individual countries relies on a set of assumptions
and caveats. Our scenarios are simplified and stylized as Kyoto-
GHG emissions are reduced to zero after 2030 to isolate the
sensitivity of GMSLR to IPCC and Paris-period-only emis-
sions. While a real-world energy system cannot produce such a
step-change reduction, it is appropriate for our attribution
design, which focuses mainly on identifying differences in sea-level
responses. Emissions are not a state variable, but a flux. The flux
step change can be handled by models like MAGICC, resulting
in peak-and-decline temperature responses (28). Projected GMT
changes have been the subject of several similar experimental
designs (29, 30).
BA C
D E F
Fig. 2. Country-specific total CO2 emission shares (GtC/y) of the biggest 5 emitters (A and D) and resulting median 2100 GMT (B and E) and 2300 GMSLR (C and F)
contributions for the IPCC (1991–2030) and Paris (2016–2030) emission accounting periods. GMT is provided in °C relative to 1750; IPCC AR5-consistent GMSLR is
provided in centimeters relative to the 1986–2005 average. Shaded GMT and GMSLR uncertainties reflect the 66% model ranges. Bars on the right show median
2300 GMSLR projections, country shares, and overall 66% uncertainty range based on the alternative DeConto and Pollard (DP16) parameterization (19).
Table 1. GMSLR commitment in 2100 and 2300 for cumulative
CO2 emissions until 1991, 2016, and 2030
CO2 emissions, GtC 2100 GMSLR, cm 2300 GMSLR, cm
Global
1991 385 22.2 (18.2 to 27.3) 58.8 (47.7 to 74.6)
2016 608 34.6 (27.2 to 43.6) 84.2 (65.5 to 109.4)
2030 765 43.0 (33.8 to 54.4) 104.6 (78.5 to 135.4)
IPCC AR5-consistent GMSLR median projections and 66% ranges are
provided relative to the 1986–2005 average. Estimates for anthropogenic
CO2 emissions including land use are calculated relative to 1750.
Nauels et al. PNAS | November 19, 2019 | vol. 116 | no. 47 | 23489
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Our experiment of assuming no further emissions beyond 2030
provides a lower bound for future sea-level-rise impacts. Reaching
net-zero GHG emissions from current NDC levels will take several
decades (23), which indicates that the real risks implied by 2030
NDC levels will be substantially higher. Our main results exclude
the higher sensitivity to global warming introduced by MICI and
hydrofracturing processes, but our sensitivity tests indicate that, as
currently understood, MICI can increase the contribution of the
Antarctic ice sheet for stronger global warming. Finally, our ap-
proach does not cover the possibility of greater emissions by 2030
than currently pledged by the NDCs, which may lead to an un-
derestimation of the presented sea-level commitments.
The assessment of future sea-level change needs to address
the associated high uncertainties. While the future responses of
thermal expansion and glaciers are reasonably well understood,
the future responses of the ice sheets, in particular the AIS with its
multimeter GMSLR potential, remain poorly constrained. The
MICI hypothesis, which was proposed after IPCC AR5, leads to
higher estimates for the future AIS GMSLR contribution, espe-
cially under strong future global warming (21, 22). However, be-
cause MICI is still under debate (22) and new insights are expected
from future work, we present sea-level-rise estimates including
MICI only as a sensitivity test.
Furthermore, our applied methodology includes a parame-
terization for the sea-level contribution from land-water storage
which is not dependent on climate change (15). This scenario-
independent median land-water contribution of around 21 cm for
2300 is based on the extrapolation of the modeled end-of-21st-
century response (31). The total NDC GMSLR commitment
presented here encompasses this land-water estimate and is sen-
sitive to its changes, highlighting the large uncertainties associated
with absolute GMSLR projections. The derived relative GMSLR
commitments for the top 5 emitters, however, would not change as
they are not sensitive to the absolute land-water contribution but
only determined by the climate-driven sea-level responses to the
2030 NDC reference pathway.
Table 2. GMSLR commitments in 2100 and 2300 for CO2 emission shares of the 5 highest-emitting countries over the specific IPCC
(1991–2030) and Paris (2016–2030) accounting periods
CO2 emissions, GtC 2100 GMSLR, cm 2300 GMSLR, cm
1991–2030,
IPCC period
2016–2030,
Paris period
1991–2030,
IPCC period
2016–2030,
Paris period
1991–2030,
IPCC period
2016–2030,
Paris period
Top 5 220 95 12.3 (9.2 to 16.7) 5.3 (4.0 to 7.0) 26.2 (18.5 to 37.8) 11.8 (8.4 to 16.9)
China 83 44 4.6 (3.5 to 6.2) 2.4 (1.8 to 3.2) 10.0 (7.0 to 14.3) 5.5 (3.8 to 7.7)
USA 59 21 3.1 (2.4 to 4.3) 1.1 (0.8 to 1.5) 6.8 (4.8 to 9.8) 2.5 (1.8 to 3.6)
EU28 41 13 2.2 (1.6 to 3.0) 0.7 (0.5 to 0.9) 4.7 (3.3 to 6.8) 1.5 (1.1 to 2.2)
India 19 11 1.2 (0.9 to 1.6) 0.6 (0.5 to 0.8) 2.4 (1.7 to 3.5) 1.4 (1.0 to 2.0)
Russia 18 7 1.2 (0.9 to 1.7) 0.5 (0.4 to 0.7) 2.4 (1.7 to 3.5) 1.0 (0.7 to 1.4)
IPCC AR5-consistent GMSLR median projections and 66% ranges are provided relative to the 1986–2005 average. GMSLR contributions and estimates for
anthropogenic CO2 emissions including land use are calculated for the 5 highest-emitting countries individually and in an aggregated way (Top 5).
A B C
E F G
D
Fig. 3. GMSLR commitments and 66% uncertainty bars for the year 2300, as well as corresponding cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions for the top 5
emitters, using the 1991–2030 IPCC (B and C) and 2016–2030 Paris emission accounting periods (F and G). In addition, 2300 GMSLR commitments for cumulative
emissions until 1991 (A) and 2016 (E) are provided together with projected total 2030 GMSLR commitment (D) based on available 2030 NDC emission pledges. IPCC
AR5-consistent GMSLR is provided in centimeters relative to the 1986–2005 average. Please note the different y-axis scaling for global GMSLR commitments
provided in A, D, and E and the specific emission accounting periods in B, F, C, and G.
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The 2300 Sea-Level Legacy of Near-Term Emissions
Sea levels will continue to rise long beyond 2300 (9, 12). Con-
strained by our methodological setup, however, 2300 emerges as a
pragmatic focal point for the analysis of commitments as it allows us
to assess GMSLR differences for near-term emission reduction
trajectories. Our analysis demonstrates that even GHG emissions
over the first decades of the 21st century will shape coastlines
around the globe for centuries to come. Previous research con-
ducted with different sea-level models and experimental setups
reached similar conclusions (11, 12). By linking 2300 GMSLR with
combined historical emissions and 2030 NDC emission reduction
pledges on a country level, we provide an angle to assess the cli-
mate impact implications of near-term national emission re-
duction targets, extending the scope beyond, for example, NDC
implications of extreme temperature (32).
Our findings also underscore the relevance of present-day
emissions in shaping the multicentury sea-level-rise response.
About 44% (20%) of the total 2300 GMSLR commitment for
emission from preindustrial until 2030 can be attributed to emis-
sions of the IPCC (Paris) period. GHG emissions by the top 5
emitting countries over the same periods contribute to 25% (12%)
of the 2300 total. The 15 y from 2016 to 2030 commit about 8 cm
of additional sea-level rise in 2100 or 20 cm of additional sea-level
rise in 2300 (Table 1), with the latter estimate being roughly
equivalent to what has occurred since the preindustrial period.
Only stringent near-term emission reductions in line with achiev-
ing the 1.5 °C long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement
would provide a chance of limiting long-term sea-level rise to
below 1 m (11). Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement,
however, global GHG emissions have not shown a sign of peaking
(33), while the current NDCs are inadequate to put the global
community on track to meet the Paris Agreement Long-term
Temperature Goal by the end of the 21st century (14).
Attributing GMSLR to pledged emission reductions not only
highlights the importance of strong near-termmitigation efforts, but
also emphasizes the inevitability of future coastal adaptation as well
as loss and damage needs related to committed multicentennial
GMSLR. Our ability to quantify and attribute such global sea-
level commitments raises highly policy-relevant questions with
respect to the need and responsibilities of supporting adaptation
and loss and damage responses in low-lying coastal zones and
small islands that will experience the most severe impacts.
Methods
We use both observed and projected GHG emissions to generate the suite of
2030 pathways used in this study. Until 2014, MAGICC was used to derive
emissions from the CMIP6 historical GHG concentrations (34–36). The 2015–
2030 emissions consistent with Paris Agreement NDCs are taken from the
CAT high-pledge scenario (25). The 2030 NDC pathway is extended until
2100 using the constant quantile extension described in Gütschow et al. (24).
The translation of the obtained pathway into the individual GHG input for
the simple climate carbon-cycle model MAGICC (17) is based on an updated
Equal Quantile Walk (EQW) method described in Meinshausen et al. (37).
The updated EQW method uses recent scenario databases (AR5, Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways, and IPCC special report on 1.5 °C of global warming)
but the same methodology as the original EQW which is based on older
scenarios like the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios.
We harmonize the CAT emissions to historical emissions with a harmo-
nization factor linearly fading out until 2030 such that we obtain a smooth
transition from historical emissions to the CAT NDC emissions levels. After
2030, we set all Kyoto-GHG (CO2, CH4, N2O, and fluorinated gases) to zero
and fade out emissions from other substances (SOX, NOX, CO, OC, non-
methane volatile organic compounds, BC, and NH3) exponentially from 2030
until 2075 to avoid a rapid temperature increase after 2030 because of
the sudden removal of substances with short-term effects. The pathway
obtained by this procedure is our NDC reference pathway.
In order to derive the country-emission shares of the top 5 emitters for the
2016–2030 period, the relative Kyoto-GHG contribution of the NDCs is nor-
malized to the emissions of the year 2015. For each GHG input, the following
temporary pathway is generated:
Etc,gðyÞ= Ec,gð2015Þ×Gglobal,gðyÞ×GcðyÞ,
where Ec,gðyÞare the emissions of country c for gas g in year y,
GcðyÞ=Ec,KyotoGHGðyÞ

Ec,KyotoGHGð2015Þ,
is the time series of the country relative to 2015, and
Gglobal,gðyÞ=

Eglobal,gðyÞ

Eglobal,gð2015Þ

Eglobal,KyotoGHGðyÞ

Eglobal,KyotoGHGð2015Þ

is the global time series for the gas g, relative to 2015 and relative to the
aggregate Kyoto gas time series. This temporary pathway is scaled such that
the sum for all gases matches the CAT scenario for the country for all years:
Ec,gðyÞ=Etc,gðyÞ

sumg

Etc,gðyÞ

×CATcðyÞ.
Before 2016, we directly use the historical gas shares as available from the
PRIMAP-hist dataset (26, 38). Two scenarios are created for each of the top 5
emitting countries, one where the country’s emissions are removed start-
ing in 1991 and one where they are only removed starting in 2016. We only
remove Kyoto GHGs and phase out non-Kyoto gases as done for the 2030
reference pathway, as changes in historical emissions for other substances
influence the internal calibration of MAGICC. To quantify the global GMSLR
commitment until 1991 and 2016, zero Kyoto-gas pathways are designed
starting for these years by applying a similar methodology to the 2030 ref-
erence pathway design. Here, non-Kyoto gases are phased out as early as
possible for the 1991 pathway starting in 2006 (to not affect the internal
MAGICC calibration), and for the 2016 zero pathway starting regularly in 2016.
For all pathways, radiative forcing is held constant after 2100 until 2300.
We use the simple climate carbon-cycle model MAGICC version 6 (17) to
translate generated GHG emission pathways into GMT responses. For ev-
ery pathway, probabilistic GMT projections are generated with a histori-
cally constrained ensemble of 600 runs, derived by a Metropolis–Hastings
Markov chain Monte Carlo approach (39). Model parameters of the en-
semble are chosen to capture IPCC AR5 equilibrium climate sensitivity esti-
mates (40, 41) and carbon-cycle uncertainties (42). As such, the probabilistic
MAGICC modeling framework consistently covers model and climate-related
uncertainties. The model is run for the period 1750–2300.
The MAGICC sea-level model (15) is one of several existing simplified
approaches to project sea-level change (16, 43–45) and emulates IPCC AR5
process-based SLR projections (5) and provides GMSLR estimates for all major
climate-driven sea-level components including thermal expansion, global
glacier mass changes, the surface mass balance, and solid ice discharge
components of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, as well as the non–
climate-driven land-water storage contribution. For each of the probabilistic
600 ensemble members, calibrated sea-level parameters are sourced ran-
domly for every sea-level component. The Antarctic ice sheet solid ice dis-
charge component was extended (20) to include a threshold-temperature
parameterization to capture potentially higher Antarctic sensitivity through
hydrofracturing and subsequent MICI that would substantially increase fu-
ture SLR projections under high-emission scenarios (21). Since the MICI hy-
pothesis is subject to ongoing scientific debate (22, 46), we only use these
projections for a sensitivity test. The MAGICC sea-level model provides
projections from 1850 to 2300, constrained by the availability of reference
data, in particular for the Antarctic solid ice discharge response (19).
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